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ACRONYMS
ccTLD country code top-level domain
DNS Domain Name System
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
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ICG IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination 
Group
IRP Panel Independent Review Process Panel
MoU memorandum of understanding
NIC Network Information Center
NTIA National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration
TLD top-level domain
USC University of Southern California 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the upcoming Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) transition, 
wherein the US government will relinquish its historic 
control over key technical functions making up the 
modern-day Internet. The chapter’s most important 
questions are: if the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the current IANA 
functions operator, is no longer accountable to the US 
government, then who should it be accountable to? And 
what form should that accountability take?
The existing contractual arrangement between ICANN and 
the US government contains more than simple contractual 
terms. Rather, many of those contractual obligations 
actually make up the core tenets of contemporary 
multi-stakeholder governance, such as:
• ICANN cannot assign the IANA functions to someone 
else;
• ICANN must operate as a multi-stakeholder, private 
sector-led organization with input from the public;
• the need to ensure quality performance of the IANA 
functions; and
• the existence of important contractual requirements 
regarding the continuity of operations.
The fact is that the Internet has become too important 
and too global for any one state to exercise exclusive 
control — even historic control. Thus, the United States 
unilaterally giving up its historic contractual stewardship 
is laudable. There is a signicant debate, however, about 
what structure should take its place — with one extreme 
arguing for a new international organization created by 
civil society, and the other extreme arguing for centralized 
state control under the auspices of the United Nations 
International Telecommunication Union.
This chapter does not engage in that debate. Rather, it 
seeks to advance a credible solution based on real-world 
facts, existing legal rules and prevailing political realities. 
It advances a balanced option that could work based on 
existing constraints, including the rapidly approaching 
deadline for the transition and the more primary concern 
of maintaining the stability of the system during the 
transition period (and beyond). In advancing this option, 
this chapter argues that the existing core contractual 
requirements imposed by the US government could 
be migrated to the existing IANA functions customers. 
This would ensure that the core tenets of contemporary 
multi-stakeholder Internet governance are built into the 
DNA of the governance regime going forward. It may 
also go a long way to preserving (and even enhancing) the 
multi-stakeholder system itself. It would create one-to-one 
accountability between the organization delivering the 
IANA service and the customers of that service.
The chapter also advances modest internal accountability 
revisions that could be undertaken within ICANN’s 
existing structure, in order to increase legitimacy within 
the broader Internet community and to enhance existing 
corporate governance. To that end, it argues that the 
independence of the Independent Review Tribunal, charged 
with taking an impartial, sober second assessment of 
certain ICANN board of directors-related decisions, could 
be increased by allowing the judges (arbitrators) that sit on 
the panel to be selected by a multi-stakeholder committee 
rather than being subject to approval by ICANN. Second, 
that the existing grounds of review could be expanded, 
allowing the tribunal — when warranted — to hear 
additional cases on a broader range of complaints. In this 
vein, this chapter adopts the conclusions from ICANN’s 
own “Improving Institutional Condence” process in 
2008-2009. This process recommended that a new 
Independent Review Tribunal be established with powers 
to review the exercise of decision-making powers of the 
ICANN board under four general rubrics: fairness, delity 
to the power, cogency of decision making and addressing 
the public interest (ICANN 2009a).1 This new tribunal 
could be drawn from a standing panel of internationally 
recognized relevant technical experts, as well as 
1 The public interest rubric is an added provision by the authors, and 
reects general provisions in ICANN’s bylaws.
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internationally recognized jurists, including persons with 
senior appellate judge experience (ibid.). This chapter also 
argues that members of ICANN’s various stakeholder 
groups and the public be able to make comments on the 
proposed bench before nal appointment.
BACKGROUND ON THE IANA 
TRANSITION
The US Department of Commerce’s National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) has ofcially announced its intention to transition 
key Internet domain name functions to the global 
multi-stakeholder community (see NTIA 2014). In response, 
ICANN, the current IANA functions operator, is convening 
with various stakeholders to develop the transition plan. 
This consultative process has led to the formation of 
the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group 
(ICG), which is comprised of 30 individuals representing 
13 direct and indirect stakeholder communities. This group 
is charged with advancing a plan that would facilitate 
the transition of these key domain name functions. This 
transition would end the primary oversight role for the 
US government in the function and maintenance of the 
core technical functions implicated in the operation of the 
Internet.
The IANA functions are a set of different technical tasks 
that are foundational for the operation of the Internet, 
functions over which the US government currently 
maintains an oversight or stewardship role.2 At their 
base, the IANA functions are a set of activities that offer 
a “coordination service for the upper-most level Internet 
identiers. These functions work to ensure the secure, 
stable, and reliable allocation, assignment, and distribution 
of those identiers, their uniqueness with respect to a 
well-dened identier space, and the recording of to 
whom and/or for what purpose they are assigned” 
(ICANN 2014b, 6). One of these key stewardship functions 
is the oversight of changes to the authoritative root zone le 
(see IANA 2014).3 The root zone le is the database that 
allows the Internet to function — acting as a global address 
book for data — containing an authoritative list of the 
names and Internet protocol addresses of all top-level 
domains.
2  For an excellent summary on the history of the IANA functions and 
the role of the US government, see ICANN (2014b).
3  According to IANA (2014), “[its] functions are a set of interdependent 
technical functions that enable the continued efcient operation of 
the Internet. The IANA functions include: (1) the coordination of the 
assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters; (2) the processing 
of change requests to the authoritative root zone le of the DNS [Domain 
Name System] and root key signing key...management; (3) the allocation 
of Internet numbering resources; and (4) other services related to the 
management of the ARPA and INT top-level domains [TLDs].”
Initially, the IANA functions were performed under a 
contract between an agency of the US government (the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and the 
University of Southern California (USC), as part of a major 
research project. From the early 1970s, IANA assigned the 
Internet protocol address numbers, while the Network 
Information Center (NIC) at the Stanford Research 
Institute published them to the rest of the network. In 
1990, this changed with the US Department of Defense 
awarding the NIC functions to Government Systems, 
Inc., which subcontracted it to the small private sector 
rm Network Solutions Inc. By 1992, with much of the 
Internet outside the US military, contracting authority for 
these publishing functions was accumulated under the 
US National Science Foundation, which awarded the NIC 
functions to Network Solutions Inc., and related directory 
and database services to AT&T. As this contract neared 
expiry in 1999, it became clear that the stable performance 
of the IANA and NIC functions were “vital to the stability 
and correct functioning of the Internet” (NTIA 2012, C.1.2). 
This led to the white paper process, which resulted in the 
formation of a multi-stakeholder organization, ICANN, to 
coordinate these functions. The initial contract to provide 
the services to perform the operation of the IANA was 
concluded between the US Department of Commerce and 
ICANN on February 8, 2000 (NTIA 2000). The publishing 
function was restructured under a Cooperative Research 
and Development Agreement between the US Department 
of Commerce and Verisign (which had bought Network 
Solutions Inc. in 2000). This contractual arrangement has 
continued, and it is the US government’s willingness 
to relinquish its contractual authority over the IANA 
functions that provides the primary mechanism for ending 
its oversight role.
However, this announcement has led to the conation 
of two different issues. The rst is the actual technical 
administration of the IANA functions, which is not an 
issue at all. In fact, a 2013 IANA functions customer 
satisfaction survey indicated that there were extremely 
high satisfaction levels among customers for these services 
(Vegoda 2013). The second, and more nuanced, issue is that 
the US government’s decision to relinquish its contractual 
authority over the IANA functions has exposed a broader 
question about ICANN’s accountability. In its most basic 
form, the questions being asked are if ICANN is no longer 
accountable to the US government for the IANA functions 
through contract, then to which organization or community 
should ICANN be accountable and what form should that 
accountability take? This seemingly simple question has 
generated much confusion and political discussion.
It is worth making an important distinction here about 
the history of ICANN’s accountability relations with the 
United States government since its inception. Initially, 
there were two established mechanisms of accountability. 
The rst was the IANA procurement contract, which is 
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discussed later. The second was the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) process by which the US Department 
of Commerce worked with the board and management 
of the new ICANN to ensure that it developed as was 
envisaged in the 1998 US white paper that had called for 
the establishment of a multi-stakeholder, not-for-prot 
entity to carry out the functions previously performed 
by US government agencies (ICANN 2000). In particular, 
the MoU process sought to ensure that ICANN “has 
the capability and resources to assume the important 
responsibilities related to the technical management 
of the DNS. To secure these assurances, the Parties…
will jointly design, develop, and test the mechanisms, 
methods, and procedures that should be in place and the 
steps necessary to transition management responsibility 
for DNS functions now performed by, or on behalf of, the 
U.S. Government to [ICANN]. Once testing is successfully 
completed, it is contemplated that management of the 
DNS will be transitioned to the mechanisms, methods, 
and procedures designed and developed in the DNS 
Project” (ICANN 1999). In practice, the development was 
undertaken by the ICANN community and embedded in 
its bylaws, procedures, organizational structure and policy 
development processes. ICANN submitted 13 reports to 
the US Department of Commerce until 2006, when the 
MoU process was amended to a nal three-year Joint 
Project Agreement. In its conclusion, the US Department 
of Commerce formally recognized ICANN as the body 
envisaged in the white paper and the two parties made 
a detailed statement of responsibilities to the broader 
Internet community. This Afrmation of Commitments 
agreement replaced the US Department of Commerce with 
an international and multi-stakeholder mechanism from 
within the Internet community that outlined ICANN’s 
commitment to:
• ensure accountability, transparency and the 
interests of global Internet users;
• enhance the operational stability, reliability, 
resiliency, security and global interoperability 
of the DNS; and
• promote competition, consumer trust and 
consumer choice, especially in domain 
names, and commit to enforcing its existing 
policy relating to WHOIS, subject to 
applicable laws. (ICANN 2009b)
Despite the widely well-received Afrmation of Commitments,4 
at least part of the international Internet and political 
communities saw (and in many cases welcomed) the 
continuance of the IANA procurement contract as an added 
political patina: that the US government would continue as a 
critical political backstop against threats to Internet stability, 
and in this conception ICANN is — at least theoretically — 
4 See https://archive.icann.org/en/afrmation/afrmation-reaction.htm.
accountable to the administration of the US government 
through the IANA contract. 
Further confusion is created by the fact that some have 
failed to recognize the distinction between accountability 
for performing the IANA functions on the one hand, and 
accountability for broad policy decisions related to the DNS 
on the other; these are not the same thing. The Department of 
Commerce has made it clear that it sees the latter covered by 
the Afrmation of Commitments and ICANN’s other similar 
frameworks. With respect to accountability for the former, 
one possible approach could be that the relevant provisions 
that rendered ICANN accountable to the US government for 
the performance of these functions and the necessary service 
standards, could simply be migrated from the contracts 
with the Department of Commerce to the contracts between 
ICANN and its IANA services customers. In this regard, 
ICANN would then be accountable to its customers through 
the law of contract for the functions and services performed 
on its behalf.
A simple two-way equal accountability to the “customers” 
or “partners” of the IANA functions, however, does have 
its limitations. In certain circumstances, the exercise 
of the IANA functions requires an exercise of superior 
power. The three clearest examples are the recognition 
of a new TLD, the re-delegation of an existing TLD from 
one administrator to another and the recognition of a 
new regional Internet registry. While upward community 
policies have been developed through the ICANN 
multi-stakeholder processes, building on earlier Internet 
community documents, such as the Internet Engineering 
Task Force’s RFC 1591 (drafted by Jon Postel in 1994),5 to 
establish the processes ICANN must follow to exercise 
this power,6 circumstances require on occasions that 
the IANA function be exercised contrary to the narrow 
interests of an existing “partner.” The cause célèbre of this 
is a “hostile re-delegation” of a country code TLD (ccTD). 
The need for IANA to be able to act to implement the 
re-delegation process is recognized in various ways in the 
existing accountability agreements between ICANN and 
84 ccTLDs.7
Consequently, this chapter proposes that, as well as 
accountability of performance of the IANA processes 
through the contracts or exchange of letters that ICANN 
has with its IANA services customers, there should also 
be a form of administrative review through appeal to the 
5 Jon Postel originated the IANA function at USC and continued to 
perform the function until the task became too demanding, leading to the 
US government’s white paper process in 1998.
6 See www.icann.org/resources/pages/background-2012-02-25-en; 
www.icann.org/resources/pages/global-addressing-2012-02-25-en; 
www.icann.org/resources/pages/new-rirs-criteria-2012-02-25-en; and 
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1591.txt.
7 See www.icann.org/resources/pages/cctlds-2012-02-25-en.
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type of review panel proposed later in the chapter. This 
will allow parties affected by this exercise of “superior 
power” to have recourse to review the delity of the 
process followed by ICANN.
Accountability for policy decisions is ab initio more 
complex. Nevertheless, when engaging in discussions 
surrounding ICANN’s accountability in the broader 
sense, it is important not to lose sight of three critical facts. 
First, ICANN already has in place a number of internal 
and external mechanisms related to accountability 
for policy decisions. Second, at present, the US 
government has not, nor is likely to, intervene in the 
decision-making process within ICANN, making this 
portion of the existing accountability relationship 
largely symbolic.8 Third, the US government made clear 
at ICANN’s Town Hall Meeting at the 2014 Internet 
Governance Forum that the discussion around enhancing 
ICANN’s accountability mechanisms should be narrowly 
focused on those related to the  IANA  functions. In 
this way, it now seems unequivocal that there is no 
open invitation to discuss major institutional change. 
Rather, when determining whether it will relinquish its 
contractual authority, the US government is interested only 
in narrowly articulated issues of accountability insofar as 
they relate to ICANN’s contractual relationship with the 
US government.
In addition to the constraint on the substantive elements 
of the accountability review, there are a number of other 
conditions that must be met in order for the transition plan 
to be accepted by the NTIA. The NTIA has indicated in 
no uncertain terms that to be accepted, the transition plan 
must:
• have broad community support;
• support and enhance the multi-stakeholder model;
• maintain the security, stability and resiliency of the 
Internet DNS;
• meet the needs of global customers for the IANA 
services;
• maintain the openness of the Internet; and
• not replace the NTIA role with a government-led or 
an intergovernmental organizational solution.
Currently, there is no consensus on an institutional 
framework that can meet these six necessary conditions. 
There is also no consensus on what the word 
8 According to Lawrence Strickling in a letter to Neelie Kroes titled 
“re: dot-xxx” on April 20, 2011: “While the Obama Administration 
does not support ICANN’s decision, we respect the multistakeholder 
Internet governance process and do not think that it is in the long-term 
best interest of the United States or the global Internet community for us 
unilaterally to reverse the decision” (Kruger 2014).
“accountability” actually means in this context, or on how 
ICANN’s broader accountability mechanisms could be 
strengthened in the absence of a contractual relationship 
with the US government.
To clear up the denitional ambiguity, this chapter 
employs a two-part denition of accountability. The 
rst involves accountability for performance, meaning 
that the IANA functions are being performed promptly, 
efciently and professionally. As a core piece of global 
critical infrastructure, one of the IANA accountabilities is 
that its processes and operations are effective 24/7/365. 
The second part adopts the denition put forward by Ruth 
W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane (2005) and assumes that 
accountability “functions to expose and sanction two sorts 
of abuses: the unauthorized or illegitimate exercise of power 
and decisions that are judged by accountability holders to 
be unwise or unjust.” Thus, in order to be accountable in 
the absence of the traditional contractual relationship with 
the US government, there must be some other mechanism 
that can function to ensure high performance standards 
and that can sanction unauthorized or illegitimate actions 
or inactions on the part of ICANN in its performance of the 
IANA functions.
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY: 
CONTRACTUAL MIGRATION OF 
CORE REQUIREMENTS FOR IANA 
FUNCTIONS
THE IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT
The IANA functions contract between the US Department 
of Commerce and ICANN includes a number of extremely 
important provisions, which are principled and sensible 
mechanisms, and which are now deeply engrained in 
the structure of contemporary Internet governance. 
However, the absence of a contractual obligation to the US 
government for these provisions could undermine their 
legal footing.
As an example, the IANA functions contract creates 
important obligations regarding how ICANN relates 
to affected parties. Under the existing contract, ICANN 
is obliged to develop a close constructive working 
relationship with all interested and affected parties to 
ensure quality and satisfactory performance of the IANA 
functions (NTIA 2012, C.1.3). ICANN is also prohibited 
from subcontracting or assigning the required services to 
another entity (ibid., C.2.1).
With respect to the establishment and collection of fees 
from the IANA functions customers, there is a contractual 
requirement to ensure that the fee levels are fair and 
reasonable, and that any proposed fee structure would 
be based on the cost of providing the specic service in 
question (ibid., C.2.3). There is also a requirement to treat 
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each of the IANA functions with equal priority, and process 
all requests promptly and efciently (C.2.4).
More generally, there are requirements to develop and 
implement performance standards (C.2.8), to process root 
zone le changes as expeditiously as possible (C.2.9.2.a) 
and to create a process for IANA functions customers to 
submit complaints for the timely resolution of disputes 
(C.2.9.2.g). The contract also creates security requirements 
(C.3), establishes a need for performance measures and 
metrics, creates a requirement to avoid conicts of interest 
(C.6) and produces a robust set of requirements regarding 
continuity of operations (C.7).
THE AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS
In the event of the US government relinquishing its IANA 
contract, any inferred enforcement mechanism for ICANN 
compliance with the Afrmation of Commitments will 
cease. The Afrmation is a contract that creates both rights 
and obligations for ICANN. The unilateral decision of the 
US government to remove itself from one of the central 
positions in Internet governance has also created an 
uncertain basis for the Afrmation. This is problematic 
because it contains some of the core tenets of contemporary 
Internet governance. This document includes a 
commitment to ensure that decisions made that are related 
to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made 
in the public interest and are accountable and transparent. 
The Afrmation also requires ICANN to: preserve the 
security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; promote 
competition, consumer trust and consumer choice in the 
DNS marketplace; and facilitate international participation 
in DNS technical coordination (ICANN 2009b).
These are incredibly powerful commitments, which 
echo some of the key tenets of Internet governance. The 
Afrmation also requires ICANN to “ensure that its 
decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests 
of a particular set of stakeholders” (ibid., paragraph 4). In 
order to achieve this, ICANN is required to perform and 
publish analyses of the “positive and negative effects of 
its decisions on the public, including any nancial impact 
on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) 
on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the 
DNS” (ibid.). Pursuant to the Afrmation, ICANN also 
commits to:
• adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting 
processes;
• fact-based policy development and cross-community 
deliberations;
• responsive consultation procedures that provide 
detailed explanations of the basis for decisions, 
including how comments have inuenced the 
development of policy considerations;
• publish each year an annual report that sets out 
ICANN’s progress against ICANN’s bylaws, 
responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans;
• provide a thorough and reasoned explanation of 
decisions taken, the rationale thereof, and the sources 
of data and information on which ICANN relied; and
• operate as a multi-stakeholder, private sector-led 
organization with input from the public, for whose 
benet ICANN shall in all events act. (ibid.)
In reviewing the commitments undertaken in the 
Afrmation, it is clear that they are more than basic 
contractual functions. Rather, they are parts of the core 
fabric of the current model of governance, as seen with 
the examples of the commitment to operate as a multi-
stakeholder institution with input from the public 
and the requirement to act in the public’s interest. 
With the absence of a contractual obligation to the 
US government for these foundational principles, the 
transition plan should seek to incorporate external 
mechanisms for preserving them. One credible way of 
doing this is to migrate the contractual obligations now 
found in the IANA services contract and the Afrmation 
into contracts with the IANA functions customers. 
Another is to bolster the existing legal responsibility of 
the ICANN board to operate according to its mission 
and core values (which include many of the Afrmation 
of Commitments details).9 Such bolstering could come 
9 ICANN’s existing legal framework establishes some administrative 
law requirements: rst, under the California Corporations Code 
provisions for not-for-prot, public benet corporations; and second, 
under common law. ICANN’s directors are required under the California 
Code to implement the purposes outlined in its Articles of Incorporation: 
“of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public 
interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating 
the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain 
universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing 
functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol (“IP”) 
address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the Internet domain name system (“DNS”), including the 
development of policies for determining the circumstances under which 
new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing 
operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) 
engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items 
(i) through (iv)….The Corporation shall operate for the benet of the 
Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity 
with relevant principles of international law and applicable international 
conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent 
with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent 
processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related 
markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate 
with relevant international organizations” (ICANN 1998).
The board members are accountable to these purposes, and the California 
Code empowers the Attorney General of California to intervene in the 
organization if they are breached. Further, a director of a non-prot public 
benet corporation owes, under common law, a duty of care to the entity. 
It is required that the director take reasonable measures to ensure that 
the organization is managed and directed in a manner that is consistent 
with its mission. For details of how this imposes public interest duties 
on the directors, see www.icann.org/en/system/les/les/acct-trans-
frameworks-principles-10jan08-en.pdf.
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through the augmented adoption of a proposal put forward 
by ICANN’s Improving Institutional Condence process 
in 2008-2009: the establishment of a new Independent 
Review Tribunal with powers to review the exercise of 
decision-making powers of the ICANN board under four 
general rubrics — fairness, delity to the power, cogency 
of decision making and addressing the public interest 
(ICANN 2009a).
MIGRATING THE CORE CONTRACTUAL 
REQUIREMENTS
Given the foundational nature of the core commitments 
found within both the Afrmation and the IANA functions 
contract, any regime adopted to facilitate the transition 
should seek to enshrine them in the future governance 
structure. These requirements should be enumerated in 
a way that renders ICANN externally accountable for 
performance standards and exposed to sanction for abuses 
or for behaving in a manner that runs contrary to these 
commitments. In order to achieve this going forward, the 
core commitments found within both the Afrmation and 
the IANA functions contract could be migrated through 
the law of contract into individualized service agreements 
with IANA services customers. As a procedural matter, it 
would also be permissible to migrate these foundational 
principles into a collective services agreement between 
ICANN and all IANA services customers, leaving the 
individualized contracts to address matters unique to 
ICANN and the individual customer in question.
On the most important tenets, it may even be advisable to 
draft a clause favouring specic performance as a remedy. 
Specic performance is a remedy that allows a court to 
require a party to perform a particular act, as an alternative 
to monetary damages. This would create a hard external 
accountability check, with a meaningful remedy provision, 
held directly by those organizations most affected by a 
particular decision, action or inaction.
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY: 
FURTHER SUPPORTING ICANN’S 
EXISTING STRUCTURE
ICANN is organized as a non-prot public benet 
corporation under the California Nonprot Public 
Benet Corporations law. Under this framework, ICANN 
(1998, paragraph 4) is designed to operate “for the benet 
of the Internet community as a whole” according to its 
Articles of Incorporation. Articles of Incorporation are 
considered to be the constitutional documents of any 
corporate structure and it is impermissible for either 
management of the corporation or the directors to behave 
in a manner that runs counter to the articles or the purposes 
articulated in that document. In this respect, at least some 
of the foundational governance principles found in the 
Afrmation are already part of the ICANN corporate 
structure. There are, however, several limited internal 
governance revisions, which could further increase 
accountability, while not adding an additional onerous 
administrative burden.
The existing governance structure of ICANN includes a 
number of mechanisms to ensure accountability within 
its operations.10 However, this chapter only examines the 
process for reconsideration and internal review of decisions 
of the ICANN board of directors, and the external and 
independent review of board decisions.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW
Pursuant to the bylaws, there is a mechanism under 
which a party aggrieved by a decision of ICANN staff or 
the board may request reconsideration or review of that 
decision. To that end, the bylaws provide that any person 
may submit a request for reconsideration or review, if they 
have been adversely affected by:
“a.  one or more staff actions or inactions that 
contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or
b. one or more actions or inactions of the 
ICANN Board that have been taken or 
refused to be taken without consideration of 
material information, except where the party 
submitting the request could have submitted, 
but did not submit, the information for the 
Board’s consideration at the time of action or 
refusal to act; or
c. one or more actions or inactions of the 
ICANN Board that are taken as a result of 
the Board’s reliance on false or inaccurate 
material information.” (ICANN 2014a, 
Article IV, section 2, paragraph 2)
The Board Governance Committee reviews and considers 
these reconsideration requests. For all reconsideration 
requests involving staff, the Board Governance Committee 
has delegated authority to make a nal determination. 
In practice, the Board Governance Committee makes a 
recommendation to the board, including a resolution, 
which the board typically adopts. With respect to board 
decisions, the bylaws provide that the “Board shall not 
be bound to follow the recommendations of the Board 
Governance Committee….The Board’s decision on the 
recommendation is nal” (ibid., paragraph 17). This is a 
reection of Californian and US federal law, which stress 
that boards cannot delegate away their nal accountability. 
In this way, reconsideration is permissible if information 
10  There are a number of mechanisms that would t under the broad 
heading of accountability that will not be considered here. These include, 
but are not limited to, bylaw requirements for transparency, information 
disclosure and nancial accountability, including external audits.
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was lacking at the time the impugned decision was made, 
or the decision runs contrary to established policy.
This provision could be strengthened by adding an 
additional substantive ground of reconsideration — 
allowing a reconsideration request to go forward if an 
aggrieved party alleges that a decision was undertaken in a 
manner that runs contrary to the public interest. Adding a 
public interest ground for reconsideration requests would 
add an additional level of assurance that decisions are 
being undertaken in a manner that adequately considers 
the implications of those decisions on the interests of the 
broader public. This will inevitably require weighing 
various interests, which may at times be conicting. 
Nevertheless, if an aggrieved party can allege a prima facie 
breach of the public interest (recognizing that a working 
denition of “public interest” will need to be articulated), 
then a substantive ground of reconsideration on this basis 
would strengthen the existing governance structure.
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS
There is also a separate process for independent third-
party review of board actions that are alleged to be 
inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or bylaws. 
In these cases, an Independent Review Process Panel (IRP 
Panel) will be established. Pursuant to the bylaws, the IRP 
Panel must apply a dened standard of review, focusing 
on the following:
“a. did the Board act without conict of interest 
in taking its decision?;
b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care 
in having a reasonable amount of facts in 
front of them?; and
c. did the Board members exercise independent 
judgment in taking the decision, believed 
to be in the best interests of the company?” 
(ibid., section 3, paragraph 4)
As a starting point, in order to strengthen the existing 
governance structure, the standard of review should 
be broadened. The current narrowly dened standard 
will allow review only in the event of a decision made 
based on a conict of interest, a lack of diligence or 
lack of independence. In order to assuage some of the 
community’s concerns regarding accountability, just like 
with the reconsideration of decisions noted above, the 
standard could be broadened to specically incorporate 
independent review on the grounds that a decision was 
taken in a manner that runs contrary to the public interest. 
This is already being done in a somewhat roundabout way. 
The board is obliged to undertake decisions that they 
believe to be in the best interest of the company, which 
are in turn based on a corporate duciary duty,11 and 
those decisions must be in accordance with the Articles of 
Incorporation. The Articles of ICANN specically articulate 
a need for operations that benet the Internet community 
as a whole. Thus, there is already a mechanism through 
which at least a portion of the public interest would be 
considered, though the Internet community is a narrower 
subset of the public — which would include individuals 
who have yet to use the Internet. However, specically 
incorporating a ground of review based on overall public 
interest would also serve to reinforce the existing review 
structure and buttress existing accountability mechanisms. 
The existing grounds of review could be further expanded 
along the lines articulated in the Improving Institutional 
Condence to include review on the grounds of fairness, 
delity and rationality. Grounds of fairness would allow 
review surrounding the integrity of the decision-making 
process. A delity review would ensure that decisions were 
untaken in a manner that was faithful to the “scope and 
objects of the power being exercised.”12 A rationality review 
would independently conrm or deny that decisions were 
made in a cogent way, taking account of relevant evidence 
and within the scope of authority. This would also be an 
important step in implementing the NETmundial outcome 
document, which specically recognizes that “the Internet 
is a global resource which should be managed in the public 
interest” (NETmundial 2014, emphasis added). Setting out 
a ground of review that recognizes this could garner a 
good amount of community support.
On the procedural side, when an independent review 
proceeding is brought, it is administered by an 
international dispute resolution provider, which is 
appointed by ICANN. In 2006, ICANN appointed the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), 
the international division of the American Arbitration 
11  Directors are subject to certain duciary duties in carrying out their 
governance responsibilities. One such obligation is often referred to as 
the “duty of loyalty,” which places two separate legal requirements on 
directors. The rst is that the director act in good faith when conducting 
the business of the corporation. The second is that the director continually 
act in the best interests of the corporation, placing the interests of the 
corporation above the interests of all others — including their own — 
when making decisions. See ICM Registry, LLC, Claimant, v. Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), Respondent, 
Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, February 19, 2010, 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dickran Tevrizian, at 74 
(“Directors of non-prot corporations in California owe a duciary duty 
to the corporation they serve and to its members, if any. See Raven’s Cove 
Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., (1981) 114 CA3d 783, 799; Burt v. Irvine 
Co., (1965) 237 CA2nd 828, 852. See also, Harvey v. Landing Homeowners 
Assn., (2008) 162 CA4th 809, 821-822.”). See also ICANN’s (2014a) Article 
VI, Board of Directors, Section 7, Duties of Directors: “Directors shall 
serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably 
believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the 
entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or 
constituencies.”
12 See https://archive.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/iic-the-way-forward-31 
may09-en.pdf.
CHAPTER FOUR: LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR GOVERNING THE TRANSITION OF KEY DOMAIN NAME FUNCTIONS
AARON SHULL, PAUL TWOMEY AND CHRISTOPHER S. YOO • 75
Association, as the provider. The provider coordinates 
the membership of the standing panel, subject to ICANN 
approval. The ICDR’s rules give each party the right to 
propose an arbitrator, with the third panellist selected 
by the ICDR. The procedural rules for the settlement of 
disputes are also subject to the approval of the ICANN 
board. These arbitrations are also non-binding,13 although 
the board has stated its intent to implement decisions of 
these sorts of arbitrations.
The most problematic element is a lack of independence 
between ICANN and the individuals appointed to hear 
a dispute involving a decision taken by the board of that 
organization. Section 3, paragraph 7 of ICANN’s bylaws 
states that all IRP Panel proceedings be administered by 
an international dispute resolution provider appointed 
by ICANN (the IRP Panel provider). The membership of 
the standing panel shall be coordinated by the provider, 
subject to approval by ICANN (ICANN 2014). The 
difculty created by this potential lack of independence is 
that the members of the arbitral panel could be beholden 
to ICANN for their position on the panel. Realistically, 
it is unlikely that an individual arbitrator would side 
with ICANN in a dispute based on the fact that ICANN 
approved their appointment to the standing roster of 
arbitrators. Nevertheless, this process of conrming 
appointments does raise the reasonable apprehension of a 
lack of independence. In order to remedy this perceived 
lack of independence, a standing committee comprised of 
various stakeholder groups could be struck to oversee the 
provider’s populating of the list of eligible arbitrators.
More substantially, the IRP Panel process could be replaced 
by the Independent Review Tribunal recommended 
by ICANN’s Improving Institutional Condence 
process. That process proposed that “the International 
Dispute Resolution Provider name a standing panel of 
internationally recognized relevant technical experts as 
well as internationally recognized jurists, including persons 
with senior appellate judge experience. The existence of a 
known and recognized ‘bench’ of ‘judges’ will add to the 
stature and authority of the Independent Review Panel. 
The panel’s members should be appointed for either a set 
period of ve years or until they resign, whichever is the 
earlier” (ICANN 2009a). This chapter proposes that the 
members of ICANN’s various stakeholder groups and the 
broader public be able to make comments on the proposed 
bench before nal appointment.
CONCLUSION
There are two major constraints on the implementation of 
any proposed mechanism that can meet the enumerated 
criteria set for any transition proposal. The rst is time. 
13 See ICM Registry, LLC, Claimant, v. Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), Respondent, Declaration of the 
Independent Review Panel, February 19, 2010.
The IANA functions contract expires in September 2015. 
The announcement that the US government was prepared 
to relinquish its contractual authority was made in March 
2014. Based on this, the ICG has established a process 
timeline for the generation of the transition proposal.
Under this process timeline, the rst stage involves 
affected communities developing their proposal text and 
submitting that material to the ICG. The current deadline 
for the submission of these materials is January 15, 2015, 
leaving approximately nine months before the contract 
expiry (or option commencement)14 period. This would 
leave approximately nine months to review the various 
proposals put forward by the community, synthesize a 
draft response, receive and respond to feedback on the 
draft proposal, ensure that the proposed system will 
actually work, and then allow adequate time for the NTIA 
to review and respond to the proposed structure.
The second constraint is scope. In addition to the 
necessary conditions imposed on the transition proposal, 
any proposed structure must also carry domestic political 
support within the United States. The former Speaker of 
the US House of Representatives Tip O’Neill once said, 
“All politics is local.” The case of the IANA functions 
transition is no different. Creating a system where the 
various accountability mechanisms previously held by the 
US government are held by the customers of the IANA 
services could be the type of private sector response that 
may carry domestic political support. Moreover, this form 
of modest and measured approach may also be practicable 
within the incredibly tight timelines associated with the 
transition.
Engaging in the moderate redesign set out in this chapter 
does not preclude the grand institutional bargain and 
redesign that some favour at a future point. Many states and 
groups within civil society are seeking a broad reimagining 
of the way that the Internet is governed, with some even 
calling existing structures illegitimate. Whether these 
concerns are warranted or not, the fact is that undertaking a 
measured approach now to the IANA transition would not 
necessarily prevent or impede a larger negotiation about 
institutional design and legitimacy. However, this could be 
done in a staged manner, addressing issues of immediate 
concern — such as the September 2015 deadline — with 
the larger and more contentious issues left for resolution 
without being imbued with a false sense of urgency.
Considering these constraints, this chapter recommends 
the following steps to help improve the accountability of 
the performance of the IANA functions by ICANN:
14  Pursuant to the IANA functions contract, the base period of 
performance of this contract is from October 1, 2012 through September 
30, 2015. However, there are two option periods, which — if exercised — 
would extend the period of performance to September 30, 2019.
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• That the relevant provisions that rendered 
ICANN accountable to the US government for the 
performance of the IANA functions and the necessary 
service standards be migrated from the contracts 
with the Department of Commerce to the contracts 
between ICANN and its IANA services customers. 
In this regard, ICANN would be accountable to 
its customers through the law of contract for the 
functions and services performed on their behalf. 
It would be advisable to include a clause favouring 
specic performance as a remedy.
• That a new Independent Review Tribunal be 
established in accordance with a proposal of ICANN’s 
Improving Institutional Condence process.
• That the tribunal be comprised of a standing panel of 
relevant technical experts and jurists, including those 
with senior appellate judge experience, appointed for 
either a set period of ve years or until they resign, 
whichever is the earlier. We propose that the members 
of ICANN’s various stakeholder groups and the 
public be able to make comments on the proposed 
bench before nal appointment.
• That if ICANN also continues with its existing 
independent review process, a standing committee 
comprised of various stakeholder groups could be 
struck to oversee the provider’s populating of the 
list of eligible arbitrators. This should counter the 
reasonable apprehension of a lack of independence 
in the present model for selection of arbitrators.
The proposed solution is not a panacea. Rather, it is put 
forward as a principled solution that could work within 
the existing constraints. However, there are a number of 
issues that will require detailed consideration in the event 
that a proposal along the lines articulated is considered 
for implementation. One concern is the issue of the 
re-delegation. In the event that accountability measures 
vest through the law of contract in the IANA functions 
customers, careful consideration will need to be given to 
the prospect of re-delegation by those customers. It will 
be important to ensure clarity and transparency around 
the cases of re-delegation, and to allow parties who are 
affected by this exercise of “superior power” to have 
recourse to administrative review through the proposed 
Independent Review Tribunal.
The transition creates an important opportunity for the 
multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance. A 
private solution ordered through contract law could create 
an important independent accountability check in the 
absence of the historical role played by the US government. 
At the same time, further renements to the Independent 
Review Tribunal, including more robust grounds of review 
in line with administrative law, could rene and enhance 
with existing governance regime.
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